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THE original function of the courts in England was to enforce
the laws. Their process led to the exertion of force against an
individual or his property. But during the nineteenth century
there came a realization of the fact that the average man does
act according to law when he knows what the law commands
him to do. He will fulfil his duties and will limit himself to his
rights when he knows what they are. But so great is the com-
plexity of modern law that the citizen is unable to determine his
rights and duties in any situation which is even a little out of
his normal course of life. What he needs is some system which
will enable him to ascertain his legal position so that he may
act accordingly. No doubt there is also the citizen who will not
obey the law even when he knows it. There is the criminal,
there is the deliberate or negligent tort-feasor, and there is the
person who finds it more convenient to break contracts than to
carry them out. But it is not necessary to assume, and indeed
it is not true, that every citizen who disputes about the nature
of his duties is anxious to avoid fulfilling them. It is more likely
that he is not fulfilling them because he does not know what they
are.
The giving of advice on these matters is the duty of the legal
adviser. The ordinary man has his solicitor whom he consults
as occasion requires. Great corporations and unincorporated
societies employ full-time solicitors. Where the law is at all
complicated the solicitor refers to a barrister. Some great cor-
porations and unincorporated societies retain barristers so as
to have such more expert advice always available. In the great
majority of cases this advice is sufficient, for the law is settled
and can be definitely ascertained by reference to the proper
sources. But no system of law can be absolutely comprehensive.
New situations arise for which no law is provided; the applica-
tion of known rules of law to new facts may be uncertain; even
the facts themselves may be disputed. In such circumstances
the law will be what the highest tribunals determine and the
facts will be as the judge sees them. The advice of the lawyer
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will be opinion only; he will have to forecast what at a later
stage a judge is likely to decide. He cannot say, "This is the
law"; he can only express the opinion that the House of Lords
would decide so-and-so.
The common law had no remedy for this state of affairs. It
could only give damages where an illegal act had been com-
mitted or some person had refrained from carrying out his legal
duty. Courts of equity went further by compelling the per-
formance of duties by means of orders for specific performance,
mandatory injunctions, and bills, of account, and by restraining
by injunction the commission of illegal acts. All these are
remedies. They compel the defendant to carry out his legal or
equitable obligations. If he refuses he can be committed for
contempt or execution can be levied against his property. But
it is rarely necessary to proceed that far. In the great majority
of cases it is not the fear of committal or execution which makes
the defendant obey the order. He obeys because he now knows
the law. Before the decision he disputed the interpretation
which the plaintiff placed upon the law; there is now no chance
of dispute. Thus the procedure in equity and especially the
procedure in suits for injunctions was more often than not
aimed chiefly at determining a point of law. It was the declara-
tion of the law which was sought by the parties; the relief was
ancillary. In most cases the relief is quite unnecessary. The
parties merely dispute as to their relative legal positions; they
can carry out the law in their own way once they know what it
is. Consequently, even assuming that an injunction or some
similar remedy is available in every case, it is not necessary.
The essence of the procedure is the declaration of the law and
the ascertainment of the facts.
That this is true as a general statement is shown by the
rapid growth of arbitration. The parties intend to carry out
their legal duties, but they dispute as to their extent. They
agree to submit the problem to an independent arbitrator. In
most cases the law is certain and the arbitrator has only to
apply it to the facts which he determines. In other cases he has
to determine the law also. But where the law is uncertain this
procedure has defects. For the law then is what the arbitra-
tor says, and one of the parties may feel that a judge would
have ruled differently from the arbitrator. What the parties
desire, therefore, is a determination by a judge, who by law
has authority to declare the-law. They do not want specific
performance or injunction or an account. They want only a
declaration as to the law and its application to the facts.
The need for some proceeding leading to a declaration is thus
evident, even if we assume that some remedy is available. But
in many cases it is not. For some reason it may not be desir-
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able to grant an injunction; I in some cases it may not be legally
possible to grant one. Yet serious injustice may result if the
courts cannot declare the law.
II
The need for some procedure leading to a declaration of law
was for these reasons strongly felt in England by the middle of
the nineteenth century. In consequence, power for this purpose
was given to the Court of Chancery by the Chancery Procedure
Act, 1852, whereby it was provided:
"No suit in the said Court [of Chancery] shall be open to
objection on the ground that a m6rely declaratory decree or
order is sought thereby, and it shall be lawful for the Court to
make binding declarations without granting consequential
relief." 2
This did not give the court authority to give a declaratory
judgment whenever it was sought by a plaintiff. Indeed, in
Rooke v. Lord Kensngton. 3 it was held that a declaration could
be made only in a suit in which the plaintiff might have other
equitable relief-though this decision has been criticised. Never-
theless, even within these limits, the procedure proved valuable.
Thus, orders were made declaring English law for the informa-
tion of a foreign courts that the plaintiff was entitled to specific
performance of a contract made with the Crown, though the
court could not give a mandatory decree, 6 that marriage articles
should be interpreted in a certain way, the court not desiring to
direct a settlement in order to save expense,-- that the plaintiff
had a lien on a testator's real estate,8 and so on.
By the Judicature Act, 1873,1 the jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery was transferred to the High Court; such jurisdiction
to be exercised so far as regards procedure and practice in the
manner provided by the Act and Rules, and where no special
provision was contained in the Act or Rules, as nearly as might
"Examples in public law will be found below.
215 & 16 VicT. c. 86, § 50 (1852).
3 2 K. & J. 753; 25 L. J. Ch. 795 (1856). See also Bristow v. Whitmore,
4 K. & J. 743; 1 Johns 96 (1858).
4 James, L. J., in Cox v. Barker, 3 Ch. D. 359, 370 (1876).
5 Hope v. Hope, 4 De G. BI. & G. 327; 23 L. J. Ch. 6S2 (1854).
6 Being a proceeding against the King, who cannot be ordered by his own
Courts.
7 Byam v. Byam, 19 Beav. 58; 24 L. J. Ch. 209 (1854).8 Norman v. Johnson, 6 Jur. (N. s.) 905 (1860).
9 36 & 37 Vior. c. 66, § 16 (1873). See now Supreme Court of Judicature
(Consolidation) Act, Section 32, 1925.
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be in the same manner as before." Power was given to the
Rules Committee by the Judicature Act, 1875,11 to make rules
regulating practice and procedure of the court.2 The Rules
Committee has exercised this power to make rules for the mak-
ing of declarations. There are now three Rules dealing with the
matter.
"No action or proceeding shall be open to objection, on the
ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order is sought
thereby, and the court may make binding declarations of right
whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed, or not."10
"In any Division of the High Court, any person claiming to be
interested under a deed, will, or other written instrument, may
apply by originating summons for the determination of any
question of construction arising under the instrument, and for
a declaration of the rights of the persons interested." 14
"The parties to any cause or matter may concur in stating the
questions of law arising therein in the form of a special case for
the opinion of the court. Every such special case shall be di-
vided into paragraphs numbered consecutively, and shall con-
cisely state such facts and documents as may be necessary to
enable the court to decide the questions raised thereby ... " 11
This third rule applies, it will be seen, only where the parties
agree to state a case. But by another rule it is provided,
"If it appear to the court or a judge, that there is in any cause
-or matter a question of law, which it would be convenient to have
decided before any evidende is given or any question or issue of
fact is tried, or before any reference is made to a referee or
arbitrator, the court or judge may make an order accordingly,
and may direct such question of law to be raised for the opinion
of the court, either by special case or in such other manner
as the court or judge may deem expedient, and all such further
proceedings as the decision of such question of law may render
unnecessary may thereupon be stayed." 10
10 Section 23.
1138 & 39 VICT. c. 77, § 17 (1875).
- This provision is now to be found in Section 99 (1) of the Supreme Court
of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, whereby, "Rules of court may be
made under this act for the following purposes:
(a) For regulating and prescribing the procedure (including the method
of pleading) and the practice to be followed in the Court of Appeal and
the High Court respectively in all causes and matters whatsoever in or with
respect to which those courts have for the time being jurisdiction .... o
13 Order XXV, rule 5; a modification of Section 50 of the Chancery Pro-
cedure Act, 1852.
14 Order LIVA, rule 1.
15 Order XXXIV, rule 1.
16 Order XXXIV, rule 2.
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This rule is often used in commercial cases for the decision
of preliminary points of law; it is not often used in other cases
because if the question of law is raised on the pleadings, it is
preferable to raise an objection in point of law (which tahes
the place of the old demurrer)."7 But it does enable one party
to have a special case stated, ith the consent of a judge, in
spite of the opposition of the other party. -Moreover, the pro-
cedure of special case stated has been applied by a number of
statutes. An official referee to whom a question has been re-
ferred by a court may state a special case for a judge.1 Arbi-
trators or an umpire acting under a submission to arbitration
may, unless the submission expresses a contrary intention, state
an award as to the whole or any part thereof in the form of a
special case for the opinion of a court;1 and any question of
law arising during the arbitration proceedings may be sub-
mitted in the form of a special case.20 Any question of rating
law may, with the consent of a judge, be submitted to the Divi-
sional Court in the form of a special case stated under the Baine's
Act 21 after notice of appeal from the assessment committee has
been given to quarter sessions. The procedure for determining
questions of law relating to national health insurance under the
National Health Insurance Act, 1924, is by way of special case
stated.23. And under the Audit (Local Authorities) Act, 1927,
when an appeal against a surcharge by a district auditor is made
to the Minister, the Minister may, and shall if so directed, state
a case for the opinion of the High Court on a point of law.2'
Cases are also stated by courts of quarter sessions and petty ses-
sions to the Divisional Court, but though the form of the judg-
ment is declaratory, so that the case has to be remitted to the
lower court whenever it is held to have been wrongly decided, in
substance it is an appeal, and need not be further considered in
this paper.
17 Under Order XXV, rule 2; ANNuAL PRAOTIcE (1931) 571.
Is Section 94 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1925. See also
Order XXXVI, rule 52.
39 Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, 52 & 53 Vicr. c. 49 (1889).
2o Section 19 of the Arbitration Act.
2112 & 13 VicT. c. 45, § 11 (1849).
22 See also Local Government Act, 1888, section 29, 51 & 52 VIcr. c. 41;
Local Government Act, 1894, section 70, 56 & 57 VICT. c. 73; London Gov-
ernment Act, 1899, section 29, 62 & 63 Vic. c. 14. All these related to the
transfer of property under these Acts and enabled a special eaze to be
stated in the event of a dispute. See also section 115 of the Housing Act,
1925, 15 & 16 GEo. V, c. 14, now repealed.
23 Section 89. See Order LYB, rules 1-11.
24 Section 2 (1). Cf. Lancaster County Council v. Crowe (No. 1) [1929]
1 K. B. 587; (No. 2) [1929] 1 K. B. 604; Stoke Newington Borough Council




It will be seen that the declaratory judgment is an instrument
of considerable importance in English legal procedure. It is con-
stantly used in the courts, and especially in the Chancery Di-
vision. But most of the cases arise upon actions for declara-
tions under the first of the rules set out above (Order XXV,
rule 5). The procedure by way of case stated is comparatively
unimportant. It is usually difficult to obtain the statement of
an agreed case,2 5 and though references from arbitrators are
common, they raise different questions from those arising on
actions for declarations. This last procedure is becoming more
and more common; nearly all the cases decided on the great
Property Legislation of 1925 are brought upon originating sum-
mons 2 6 with the purpose of obtaining a declaration. The subject
is, in fact, so vast that it is desirable to limit our consideration
to one branch of the law only, namely, that branch which relates
to proceedings against public authorities. It is not that the pro-
cedure in this branch is substantially different from that used
in other branches.9 The law is the same, but the procedure is
peculiarly appropriate to public law, because specific relief is
generally unnecessary against a great public authority, which
is extremely unlikely to break the law deliberately; and more-
over there are problems raised in public law which do not appear
elsewhere. We shall limit ourselves, therefore, to the action for
a declaration under Order XXV, rule 5, and shall consider only
-, its use against public authorities.
-g The procedure, it will be seen, depends entirely upon a rule
esibade by the Rules Committee under statutory authority. The
£Iar hority is only to make rules for practice and procedure "in
fIrlevauses and matters whatsoever in or with respect to which
the High Court and the Court of Appeal have for the time being
ju risdiction." 27 The difficult question of law is, therefore,
whether-it is legally possible for the Rules Committee to give
°a6)9 ou& authority to make a declaratory judgment even where
conseqq l relief could not be claimed. But it is only the
exceptinal cases which come within this provision, and in order
to study the working of the system in public law it is desirable
r the use of declaratory judgments where some
-i could be given. It will suffice for this pur-
e I o ufjs umb1 fef±L
od o4 A sM{ijntt of public law, Reigate Corporation v. Surrey County
,1Rp~g og9g§ t 9; Dennerley v. Prestwich Urban Council, [1930] 1
K. B. 334; City of London Corporation v. London County Council, [1931)
1 K. B. 25.
ic an 'ctiop"fi see Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolida-
. Ot . 15 & 16 GEO. V, c. 49. Order XXV rule 5,
appfes ogt"nsummofis under Order LIVA.
See note 12, supra.
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pose to take the decisions in which declarations are claimed
and which have been reported in the law reports during the
past thu-ee years. These will not be cases in which the use of
the declaration has given rise to any argument; they will be
cases reported because other points of law have been raised
in them. But we may regard them as typical instances of the
procedure.
The defendants in Crediton Gas Co. v.. Crediton Urban
Cuncl728 had given notice to terminate an agreement for the
supply of gas. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the con-
tract was perpetual. It is clear that an action for damages could
have been brought; but there was no damage until the notice
had terminated, and the action, if brought before the termina-
tion of the notice, would have been in essence an action for a
declaration. It is not likely that specific performance or an
injunction would have been given. It was therefore more con-
venient to sue for a declaration which was, in fact, all that the
plaintiffs wanted.
In Manchester Corporation v. Avden.w o Urba.n Cowuzcl :
the plaintiffs sought a declaration that under a local act they
were bound to maintain a road in such a state of repair as would
have been suitable for traffic when the act was passed in 1878
and not, as the defendants contended, so as to make it suitable
for modern motor traffic. No other remedy was open to the
plaintiffs except (possibly) injunction. But the Corporation
could have made default and proceedings could then have been
taken by the defendants. The dispute was brought to an end
by the action for a declaration.
In Davies v. Ripon Corporation 3 the plaintiff sought a dec-
laration that the defendants were not entitled to lay, maintain,
or repair gas and water pipes on the plaintiff's land, an order
to remove the pipes, and an injunction to restrain them from
using them. The substance of the action was the determina-
tion of the point of law, since no one expects a corporation to
continue to use pipes after the user has been declared illegal.2 '
28 [1928] Ch. 447.
- [1928] Ch. 763 (C. A.).
30 [1928] Ch. 884.
31 In London County Council v. Greenwich Borough Council, [1929] 1 Ch.
305, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that a site was a disused burial
ground, and an injunction to restrain the defendants from building on it.
The declaration was made, and an injunction to restrain building and a
mandatory injunction to pull down e.'dsting buildings granted.
In Hoskyns-Abrahall v. Paignton Urban Council, [1929] 1 Ch. 375, the
plaintiff claimed a declaration that a burial vault was her property and
that by-laws of the Council conflicting with her property were void, and
an injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering. The defendants
counterclaimed for a declaration that the plaintiff was not entitled to open
the vault save for the purpose of interment, and subject to the by-laws,
1932] 413
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In Attorney-General v. Leeds CorporationA2 the attorney-
general at the relation of a ratepayer 13 of Leeds sought a
declaration that the Corporation was not entitled to run omni-
buses beyond the city boundary and an injunction. A declara-
tion was given in a modified form; the Corporation then gave
an undertaking in the terms of the declaration and it was not
considered necessary to grant an injunction.
In Field v. Poplar Borough Council 14 a local government
officer sought a declaration that a resolution of the Council re-
ducing his salary was ultra vires, an injunction to restrain the
defendants from acting upon it, a declaration that he was en-
titled to be paid a certain salary so long as he held the office,
and arrears of salary. Since it is unlikely that an injunction
in the terms of the second declaration would have been granted,
the plaintiff was able to have his future rights declared in a
manner which would have been otherwise impossible but for
Order XXV, rule 5.3:
In Attorney-General v. Birkenhead Corporation 10 the attorney-
general sued at the relation of a ratepayer claiming (1) declara-
tions that (a) resolutions of certain councils were void, (b)
it was not lawful to act upon such resolutions, (c) certain de-
cisions of the Council were void; and (2) an injunction to re-
strain the defendants from acting on the resolutions. An
injunction was refused on the ground that there was no evidence
of a general desire to oppress persons or to put the resolutions
into effect. A declaration in a modified form was granted.
In Attorney-General v. Tynemouth Guardians 31 the attorney-
general sued at the relation of Tynemouth Corporation (which
was by statute to take over the assets of the defendants at a
and an injunction. Eve, J., gave a declaration in terms of the counterclaim
and gave liberty to apply for an injunction if it should prove necessary,
See 45 T. L. R. 161, which is a better report as to the procedure.
In Stevens v. Hempstead Borough Council, [1929) 2 Ch. 239, a servant
sought (1) a declaration that he was entitled to certain bonuses, (2) an
account, and (3) payment of what was due. The action was in the nature
of a test case and the declaration of the law was clearly its object.
In Brown v. Dagenham Urban Council, [1929] 1 Ch. 305, a local govern-
ment officer sued for damages for wrongful dismissal. He was supported
by the National Association of Local Government Officers, who desired a
declaration of right for use in similar cases.
32 [1929] 2 Ch. 291.
3 The attorney-general sued because the relator was not injured except
as ratepayer. In other words, he was in no different position than any other
member of the public. The action had, therefore, to be in the name of the
attorney-general, whose function it is to act as guardian of the public on
behalf of the King.
- [1929] 1 K. B. 750.
835 See Section I, supra note 13.
3027 L. G. R. 192; J. P. 33 (1929).
37 [1930] 1 Ch. 616.
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subsequent date) for (1) a declaration that a resolution of the
defendants cancelling debts due to them was ,ldtr. vires, (2)
an injunction to restrain them from acting on it, and (3) a
mandatory injunction to order them to take steps to recover
the balance of sums due.
In Attorney-Ge~eral v. Sztnde;' a Corporatio 3 the attorney-
general sued at the relation of a ratepayer for (1) a declara-
tion that the defendants were not entitled to provide a parking-
place for cars on a certain piece of land, and (2) an injunction.
This survey of recent decisions indicates that the normal use
of the action for a declaration is in cases where "consequential
relief is or could be claimed." Sometimes the plaintiff adds a
request for a declaration as ancillary to a request for con-
sequential relief. Sometimes the basis of the action is a desire
to have the law determined, so that the request for consequential
relief is ancillary, and the gist of the action is the request for
a declaratory judgment. In these cases counsel is following the
advice of the ANNUAL PRACTICE: "The plaintiff should always
claim in the one action every kind of relief to which he is en-
titled-be it damages, or an injunction, a declaration, a man-
damus, or a receiver." 39 But sometimes this advice is not fol-
lowed. The plaintiff is well aware that the defendant will carry
out the law, but he wants it ascertained; a declaratory judg-
ment is all that is needed, and therefore all that the plaintiff
asks. This is particularly true in public law; where the defend-
ant is a great public authority it is futile, except in extreme
cases, to ask for consequential relief. Sometimes, indeed, the
obvious method of enforcement is not by judicial decree. Many
public authorities are under the control of some higher public
authority.40 What the plaintiff wants, therefore, is a statement
of law by a competent tribunal, so that if necessary the com-
petent administrative authority may enforce it. For instance,
in Attorney-General v. Merthyr Tydfil ULion 4 the relator (on
whose behalf the attorney-general sued) alleged that the Guard-
ians of the Union were granting poor relief illegally2 The
attorney-general therefore asked for a declaration and an in-
junction. The injunction was not granted, but if it had been
granted the method of enforcement would nevertheless have
been a surcharge by district auditors. "The plaintiffs ask the
Court to state the law for the guidance of the tribunal which
has to deal with the administration of the poor-rate", observed
38 [1930] 1 Oh. 168 (C. A.).
3 9 ANNUAL PRACTICE (1931) 370.
40 This is particularly true of local government. See JENNINGS, PRU4-
CIPLES OF LOCAL GOVERNtiENT LAW (1931) c. V (Central Control).
41 [1900] 1'Ch. 516.




counsel in his speech to the court.43
These cases, the common cases, of declaratory -judgments are
cases in which some other remedy is or could be claimed. The
parties desire a declaration because it is convenient for them
to have a declaration in a certain form, with the approval of
the court. It is convenient for the plaintiff to say to the de-
fendant: "This is the law". It is bad policy, both in administra-
tion and in business, to threaten a person with whom one is in
dispute. One keeps firmly to one's opinion and asks the court
to confirm it, believing that the other party will do what is right
if he is proved to be wrong. The declaratory judgment is the
symbol of the twentieth century conception of the law.
At the same time, there is a substantial dispute between the
parties. We are assuming for the moment that some other
remedy is or could be given. That remedy will not be given
unless there is a controversy. Given that there would be a "case
or controversy" if some other remedy were sought, it would
seem to be difficult to deny that there was a "case or contro-
versy" where the judgment was declaratory only. The form of
the judgment does not alter the nature of the, dispute.
IV
This is not, however, the only class of cases covered by the
Rule. A declaratory judgment may be made "whether any con-
sequential relief is or could be claimed, or not." This raises at
once the questions of the nature of a declaratory judgment and
the validity of the Rule. The Rules Committee has power to
make rules for practice and procedure in all causes arid matters
in or with respect to which the High Court and the Court of
Appeal have for the time being, jurisdiction. If the action for
a declaration extends the jurisdiction of the court, the Rule
is invalid.
To say what is the jurisdiction of the High Court is a most
difficult task. It is, of course, defined by .statute " since it was
the creation of statute. But this definition refers only to the
jurisdiction of the old courts of common law and equity. Speak-
ing generally, and subject especially to modifications which have
been made by statute, the High Court may decide any matter
which could have been decided by one of the old. courts before
1873.41 But this in fact means that the jurisdiction of the High
Court is unlimited except in special matters specially excepted
by law. The old rule was that a plea to the jurisdiction of a
(superior court had to be specially pleaded, whereas special plead-
43 At 534.
44 Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925 sections 18-25.
45 Ibid. section 18.
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ing was unnecessary when the objection was to the jurisdiction
of an inferior court. Hence "nothing shall be intended to be
out of the jurisdiction of a superior court but that which spe-
cially appears to be so".-6 Thus the High Court has a general
jurisdiction. This does not mean that it can take cognizance
of matter which has not been taken away by law: it does not
mean that the courts can usurp a legislative or an administra-
tive authority. It means only that where there is a dispute about
a iigqrit, the superior courts have cognizance of it unless the
contrary can be shown.
"If the right exists, the presumption is that there is a court
which can enforce it, for if no other mode of enforcing it is
prescribed, that alone is sufficient to give jurisdiction to the
King's court of justice. In order to oust jurisdiction it is neces-
sary, in the absence of a special law excluding it altogether, to
plead that jurisdiction exists in some other court." -I
The manner in which this general jurisdiction will be exer-
cised depends upon the law of procedure for the time being.
Since 1873 the Rules Committee has had power to legislate on
this subject. It follows that the Rules Committee can provide the
method by which disputes relating to existing rights may be
determined, but cannot create new substantive rights. Provided
that there is a dispute about legal rights it seems to follow
that a rule providing for declaratory judgments is in'tr vires,
even though no consequential relief could be claimed. But there
must be a dispute about legal rights; the function must be a
judicial one. This principle was laid down by the Court of
Appeal in London Association of Shipozwzers aizd Broklrs V.
Indim Docks Joint Committee4 4 where a declaration was sought
that certain regulations were invalid, and an injunction restrain-
ing the defendants from enforcing them. On the special facts
a declaration was given, but the main argument turned on the
position of a co-plaintiff who had suffered no injury by the
regulations. "The P. & 0. Co. is not like the Attorney-General",
said Lord Justice Lindley, "and is not entitled to sue on behalf
of the public for the purpose of preventing the defendants from
exceeding their statutory powers irrespective of any particular
4 G Peacock v. Bell, 1 Wins. Saund. 75 r (1667), quoted by Willes, J., in
advising the House of Lords in Mayor of London v. Cox, L. R. 2 H. L. 239,
259 (1866), and approved by the House of Lords in that case and by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Board v. Board, [1919] A. C.
956. See also Jennings v. Hankyn, Carth. 11 (1741); Mostyn v. Fabrigas,
1 Sm. L. C. 662, 675 (1774), per Lord Mansfield; Earl of Derby v. Duhe of
Athol,* 1"Ves. Sen. 203 (1748) per Lord Hardwcke.
47 Board v. Board, [1919] A. C. 956, 963. Cf. Ashby v. White, 1 Si. L. C.
268; 2 Ld. Raym. 938 (1702).
48 [1892] 3 Ch. 242.
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injury to any particular individual. The P. & 0. Co. must show
that it is aggrieved before it is entitled to any declaration or
relief in an action brought by itself." 19 And Lord Justice Bowen
said: "In order to succeed, the Plaintiffs are bound to show that
the Defendants have either infringed some legal right of the
Plaintiffs, or of some one or more of the Plaintiffs, or that the
Defendants threaten to infringe some such right".50
The point was, however, more directly raised in Guaxranty
Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay & Co.51 Proceedings had been
taken in the United States on a bill of exchange; it was ad-
mitted that English law applied. The defendants in that action,
which was still proceeding, then took action in the High Court,
asking for declarations to the effect that they were not liable on
the bill and for injunctions. The case came before the Court of
Appeal as an action for declarations only, it being assumed
(though Lord Justice Pickford obviously doubted on this point)
that no consequential relief could be claimed. No declarations
were given, but the court investigated the whole question of
their powers. There were really two questions: the first was,
does the rule give authority to make a declaration where it was
not ancillary to putting some rights in the person asking the
declaration? And the second was: if the rule does permit such
a declaration, is it ultra vires? The Court of Appeal, by a ma-
jority, answered the first question in the affirmative, and the
second in the negative. The reasons given by the majority,
Lord Justice Pickford and Bankes, were not in every respect
the same. But essentially they come to this. The word "juris-
diction" is used in two senses: in the first the expression that
the court has no jurisdiction means that it cannot deal with the
subject-matter of the action, no matter by whom and in what
form it is raised; in the second sense it means that the court
can deal with the subject-matter, but through the development
of the rules of law and equity it does not choose to deal with it
in the particular form in which it is raised. The first sense is
the only correct one; in that sense the Rules cannot increase the
jurisdiction. The second sense merely refers to practice and pro-
cedure, and in this sense the jurisdiction can be enlarged. For
"the mere fact of being entitled to a right does not give a cause
of action, which only arises when there is interference, actual
or threatened, with the right, and in that case there is a right
to relief, in the first case by damages or injunction or both,
or possibly by specific performance, and in the latter by injunc-
tion"2.2 But where there is a substantial dispute about a right,
49 Ibid. 257.
-50 Ibid 261.




a declaration can be made.
"There is, however, one limitation which must always be at-
tached to it, that is to say, the relief must be something which
it would not be unlawful or unconstitutional or inequitable for
the Court to grant or contrary to the accepted principles upon
which the Court exercises its jurisdiction. Subject to this limita-
tion I see nothing to fetter the discretion of the Court in exer-
cising a jurisdiction under the rule to grant relief, and having
regard to general business convenience and the importance of
adapting the machinery of the Courts to the needs of suitors
I think the rule should receive as liberal a construction as pos-
sible." 53
But no declarations were made because, as Lord Justice Pick-
ford put it, the plaintiffs in this action were trying to avoid
being defendants in the action in New York; or, as Lord Justice
Bankes put it, because they were merely asking the court to
provide evidence for their proceedings in New York.
Finally, the matter came before the House of Lords in Rus-
sian Commercial and I-dustrial Bank v. British Bank for For-
eign Trade.54 This was an action for a declaration that the re-
spondents were entitled to possession of certain pledged bonds
on paying the sum borrowed. The object of the action was to
have the law deter'mined without bringing a redemption action.
For in such an action the plaintiffs would have been ordered to
pay in rubles or in sterling according to the decision of the
court. But while the plaintiffs were prepared to pay in rubles to
get the bonds, they preferred not to have the bonds than to
pay in sterling. The House sustained the power to make a dec-
laration, but the majority thought that this was not the sort
of case in which it ought to be made. The power of making
declaration "is a very wide power, and it is obvious that it is
one that should be exercised with the utmost caution." The
Order was not intended to enable the mortgagor to pick out
one point on which it might be convenient for him to know the
law, and ask the court to decide it in this summary way by
declaration.
Thus, the court has power to make a declaration limited only
in these respects: first, the matter must not have been with-
drawn from its jurisdiction; secondly, it must be a dispute re-
lating to the legal rights of the parties; and thirdly, the remedy
is discretionar, and where consequential relief could not be
given the power should be exercised with extreme caution. "In
my opinion", said Lord Sterndale in Hanson v. Radcliffe Urban
Council, "the power of the Court to make a declaration, where
it is a question of defining the rights of two parties, is almost
53 1bid. 572.
- [1921] 2 A. C. 438.
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unlimited; I might ay only limited by its own discretion. The
discretion should of course be exercised judicially, but it seems
to me that the discretion is very wide." rs
But the value of the remedy is shown by that very case. An
employee of the Council sought a declaration that notice given
by the Council to terminate her appointment was invalid and
inoperative and her engagement unaffected, and also an injunc-
tion to restrain the defendants from acting on the notice. Lord
Justice Warrington said:
"Here is a public body, entitled under certain circumstances
to interfere with the rights of other persons. It does so with
no authority. It seems to me it would be nothing short of a
disaster if the Court had no power to make a declaration up-
holding the rights of those other parties and restraining that
wrongful interference." 5r
It has been indicated that jurisdiction has in some cases been
taken away from the High Court. This is especially true of
public law, where the judicial control has in many matters been
vested in courts of summary jurisdiction or in administrative
tribunals. The general proposition that the High Court has no
power to make a declaration in such circumstances was laid
down by the House of Lords in Barraclough v. Brown.0 This
began as an action for the recovery of the expense of removing
a vessel from a canal; but the matter was within the jurisdic-
tion of a court of summary jurisdiction. It was argued that
nevertheless the court could make a declaration for the guidance
of the inferior court. But it was held that, though the House
might accede to the suggestion if it were necessary to do justice,
there was nothing in the Rule to give the court this jurisdiction.
In any case, the Rules Committee had no power to deal with
such cases, since they were not within the jurisdiction of the
court.
But courts of equity had been in the habit of granting in-
junctions to restrain inferior courts from dealing with cases
which were alleged to come within their jurisdiction. In other
words, the Court of Chancery had taken upon itself to interpret
the extent of the inferior courts' powers. It was not necessary
to plead to the jurisdiction in the inferior court, the prospective
defendant might instead apply for an injunction in the Court
of Chancery.'8 In Grand Junction Waterworks Co. v. Hampton
&5 [1922] 2 Ch. 490, 507.
56 Ibid. 508.
57 [1897] A. C. 615; followed in Baron Reitzen de Marionwert v. Adminis-
trator of Austrian Property, [1924] 2 Ch. 282, where the inferior court was
an administrative tribunal.
58 Lord Auckland v. Westminster District Board of Works, L. R. 7 Ch.
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Urban Comwil -1 it was argued that, in spite of Barraclough v.
Brown, a declaration might be given in such circumstances. The
court agreed, adding, however, that the jurisdiction was to be
exercised with extreme caution and in very special cases only.
There has been a tendency to extend this to any case in which
for some reason it is not desirable that the question should be
left to be decided by the inferior court. Thus in Islgtai Irestry
v. Hormsey Urboan Couicil 00 a declaration was granted that the
plaintiffs were entitled to relief in respect of the use of their
sewer by the defendants. This case is also an illustration of
the value of the declaratory judgment. The plaintiffs sought an
injunction, but it was quite impossible for the defendants at
once to cease using the sewer. If they did, they would have been
unable to dispose of the sewage and so would have committed
nuisances. The court therefore gave a declaration, with liberty
to apply for an injunction if the defendants did not provide
their own sewer within a reasonable time.
In Elsdon v. Ha~pstead Corporation 1 an owner of houses
in a new street obtained a declaration that a revised apportion-
ment of expenses of making up the road was invalid, although
such matters could be determined by courts of summary juris-
diction. In Barwick v. South Eastern a.zd Chiathmn Raflway C-
the circumstances were rather peculiar. Certain land having
been reclaimed from the sea, the railway company under statute
claimed a compulsory lease. But before the lease was granted
the Government took possession under wartime powers. Where
the Government is in occupation no local rates are payable,
since the Rating Acts do not bind the Crown. But it is cus-
tomary to make a payment in lieu of rates. The overseer of
the parish accordingly put in a claim, but it was refused on
the ground that the land was not in his parish. No remedy
lay against the Crown, nor could the assessment committee, the
tribunal which normally decided rating questions, determine the
question. The overseer therefore sought a declaration against
the railway company on the ground that it was not a stranger,
but was interested in the question. This declaration was granted,
it being "necessary in order to do justice".
597 (1871) ; criticised in Kerr v. Preston Corporation, 6 Ch. D. 463 (1876);
Stannard v. Vestry of St. Giles, Camberwell, 20 Ch. D. 190 (18S2).
5 [1898] 2 Ch. 331. Followed in Merrick v. Liverpool Corporation, [1910]
2 Ch. 449.
-6 [1900] 1 Ch. 695. But see Clark v. Epsom Rural Council, [1929] 1
Ch. 287, where the circumstances were slightly different and the court re-
fused a declaration.
61 [1905] 2 Ch. 633.




Subject to the qualifications already set out, the court has dis-
cretion to make a declaration even where no consequential relief
could be claimed. But so far nothing has been said about the
group of cases wherein this right has proved to be most useful
in public law. It is well known that no action lies against the
Crown for any tort of a public servant. An action lies against
the public servant if he personally commits the tort, but not if
it was committed by some person under his control. On the other
hand, no action for breach of a public contract lies against a
public officer, though a petition of right may be addressed to
the Crown, and will be tried by the court if the royal flat is
obtained. These rules being most inequitable, all sorts of devices
have been tried for getting round them. Among them the action
for a declaration has been used.
In Dyson v. Attorney-GeneraZ 0 3 the plaintiff sought a declara-
tion that certain requisitions issued by the Commissioners of
Inland Revenue were illegal. It is clear that no other action lay
against either the Crown or the commissioners. If a declara-
tion could not be granted the plaintiff's only remedy would be
to refuse to carry out the requisitions and to deny their validity
on being sued for a penalty. In the meantime, thousands of less
bellicose taxpayers would have answered them. "It would be a
blot on our system of law and procedure", said Lord Justice
Farwell, "if there were no way by which a decision on the true
limit of the powers of the commissioners can be obtained by any
member of the public aggrieved, without putting himself in the
invidious position of being sued for a penalty." 04 And in the
substantive action Lord Justice Fletcher-Moulten said:
"It would be intolerable that millions of the public should
have to choose between giving information to the Commissioners
which they have no right to demand and incurring a severe
penalty. There must be some way in which the validity of the
threats of the Commissioners can be tested by those who are
stibjected to them before they render themselves liable to penalty,
and I can conceive of no more convenient mode of doing so than
by such an action as this." 61
Partly for this reason, but mainly because the attorney-gen-
eral has for centuries been the proper officer to protect the King's
rights in chancery, the court made the declaration. They spe-
63 [1911] 1 K. B. 410; followed in Burghes v. Attorney-General, [1912]
1 Ch. 173. For other examples see Nixon v. Attorney-General, [1930] 1 Ch.
506; Egan v. Attorney-General, [1931] A. C. 113.
G4 Dyson v. Attorney-General, supra note 63, at 420.
65 [1912] 1 Ch. 158, 168.
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cially guarded themselves, however, against the supposition that
in every case where a person was likely to be made defendant
he could make himself plaintiff by bringing an action for a
declaration.
A very similar case was Grant v. Knarcsborough Urban
Cowncil,cc where, however, the attorney-general was not a party.
The complaint was that certain forms issued by the defendant
were ultra vires and void. The defendants withdrew their de-
fence, but the plaintiff wished to have a declaration of invalidity;
he did not, therefore, move for judgment in default of defence,
but produced his evidence. Thus, he obtained a decision on a
point of law although he no longer had any complaint.
The real basis of the decision in Dyson v. Attoracy-Gencral
was the defendant's special position as protector of the King's
rights. There was no such argument in China Steam Navigation
Co. v. Maxlay.617 This was an action against the shipping con-
troller for a declaration that in spite of a requisition of the
ship under the Defence of the Realm Act a voyage on which
the ship was engaged was for the owner's benefit. The defendant
could not have been sued in tort, if one was committed, because
it was not proved that he himself made the requisition. A
declaration was granted on the ground that an officer of state
has to justify an act which is unlawful, and this justification
can be inquired into by the courts. It was attempted to carry
the principle a step further in Bombay and Persia Steam Nauiga-
tion Co. v. MaeatyV68 where a direction of the shipping controller
caused loss to the plaintiffs. It was not alleged that the direc-
tion was unlawful, so that the claim was based on contract. But
in the case of contract or money liability apart from tort there
is no question of suing the public officer, who is merely an agent
for the Crown. What the plaintiff was seeking in this case was
to establish his right against the treasury by suing a public
officer in his own name. Justice Rowlatt refused to make a
declaration. The earlier case against the shipping controller
was of a different nature; and the Dyson case was decided on
the special position of the attorney-general. It was suggested
that this defect might be cured by adding the attorney-general
as a co-defendant. But if this were done the procedure by
petition of right would never be used. For the attorney-general
could hardly refuse to appear, whereas no petition of right
could be brought without the Crown's fiat.60
,O [1928] Ch. 310.
17 [1918] 1 K. B. 33.
16 [1920] 3 K. B. 402.
19 But this does not mean that an action for a declaration cannot be
brought where a petition of right would lie. Electrical Development Co. of




Our examination of the English decisions leads us to the con-
clusion (1) that the court can make a declaratory judgment
as an alternative remedy in any case where other relief might
be claimed; and (2) that even where no consequential relief
could be claimed the court can make a declaration provided that
(a) the jurisdiction of the court has not been excluded, (b)
there is a real dispute as to legal or equitable rights between
the parties to the action, and (c) the remedy is discretionary,
and will not be granted in such cases save with extreme caution.
Within these limits the remedy has proved most valuable.
Expressions of approval by judges of the Supreme Court have
already been quoted. To these may be added the verdict of
Lord Justice Atkin (as he then was) in Simmonds v. Newport
Abercamrn Black Vein Steam Coal Co.:
"I have no hesitation in saying that this is precisely the kinid
of case in which the Court has power to grant relief by way of
declaratory judgment, and I should be sorry to cut down a
jurisdiction which was a most valuable addition to the existing
powers of the Court.... The Court has power to make a declara-
tion whenever it is just and convenient." 10
It is not for an English lawyer to attempt to interpret the
American Constitution. But if it is decided that an action for
a declaration is not a "case or controversy" the Supreme Court
will be depriving the American legal system of a possible pro-
cedure of a most valuable kind.1 It cannot be said that the
judges in England regard such an action as anything but a
"case or controversy". "Surely," said Lord Justice Bhnks, "a
declaration by the High Court of Justice of a plaintiff's rights
in: a dispute between him and his employer is of itself a grant-
ing of relief at least as great as a conviction of the employer
in a Court of summary jurisdiction." 72
Bros. v. Earl of Derby, [1918] 2 K. B. 671, where an action against the
Secretary of State for War was framed both in contract and in tort.
70 [1921] 1 K. B. 616, 630.
71 Cf. Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282
(1927); Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 277 U. S. 274, 48 Sup.
Ct. 507 (1928). See Borchard, The Constitutionality of Declaratory Ju yt-
ments (1931) 31 COL. L. Rnv. 561.
72 Simmonds v. Newport Abercarn Black Vein Steam Coal Co., [1921]
1 K. B. 616, 626.
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